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PARTITIONING AND RIGHTS: 
THE SUPREME COURT‘S ACCIDENTAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
JAMES A. GARDNER* 
ABSTRACT 
 In democracies that allocate to a court responsibility for interpreting and enforcing 
the constitutional ground rules of democratic politics, the sheer importance of the task 
would seem to oblige such courts to guide their rulings by developing an account of the 
nature and prominent features of the constitutional commitment to democracy. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, has from the beginning refused to develop a general account—a 
theory—of how the U.S. Constitution establishes and structures democratic politics. The 
Court’s diffidence left a vacuum at the heart of its constitutional jurisprudence of demo-
cratic process, and like most vacuums, this one was almost immediately occupied. But the 
Court filled its jurisprudential hole not primarily by invoking principles of democracy—
even unstated ones—but by doing instead what reluctant decision makers often do: by 
reaching for whatever is handy. In a path-dependent series of small but fateful steps, the 
Court’s reaction took two main forms. First, in the absence of a pertinent theory to guide 
it, the Court fell back on habit, specifically a habit, developed in its earliest cases, of solv-
ing problems of political power and representation by partitioning the electorate—that is, 
by ordering it subdivided. By resorting reflexively to this approach, the Court soon came 
to treat partitioning as the preferred solution to most problems of democratic representa-
tion. Second, the Court reached for the tools of decision that were most ready at hand, 
and those tools were individual rights, initially equal protection, then the freedoms of 
speech and association. But because these tools were ill-suited to the task, the Court ended 
up stretching First Amendment analysis in these cases beyond its plausible bounds and 
purposes. A well-ordered democratic state needs a thoughtful and deliberate jurispru-
dence of democracy and democratic practice. Instead, the Court has provided an acci-
dental, haphazard jurisprudence of habit and availability. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 If the main function of a constitution is to set the ground rules by 
which a polity governs itself,1 then in constitutional democracies 
                                                                                                                  
 * Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law 
School, The State University of New York. An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at a workshop on Electoral Law: The Virtuous or Vicious Circle of Theory and Practice, at 
McGill University Law School, Montreal, Quebec, November 19, 2013. I wish to thank the 
organizers, Hoi Kong, Han Ru Zhou, and Maxime St.Hilaire, for their kind hospitality. My 
thanks also to Guy Charles and Michael Halberstam for comments on a prior draft, and to 
Andrew DeMasters for valuable research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. X (Richard H. 
Cox, ed. 1982) (1690) (describing how members of a civil society create a form of govern-
ment). For a more contemporary account, see RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, 
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surely the most significant ground rules are those structuring demo-
cratic politics. These are the rules that establish the basic framework 
within which social disagreements are resolved, the processes by 
which binding agreements are negotiated, and the criteria by which 
such resolutions are to be deemed legitimate by those of whom sub-
mission to official power is demanded.2  
 In polities that, like the United States, allocate to a court respon-
sibility for interpreting and enforcing the constitutional ground rules 
of democratic politics, the sheer importance of the task would seem to 
oblige such courts, when adjudicating disputes over basic democratic 
processes, to guide their rulings by developing an account of the na-
ture and prominent features of the constitutional commitment to de-
mocracy. The very definition of a constitution is sometimes said to 
include not only the constitutional text, but also a ―nation‘s . . . domi-
nant political theories.‖3 It is widely agreed that courts cannot in 
practice decide constitutional cases involving regulation of the demo-
cratic process without resort to some underlying theory of democratic 
politics—―engagement with structural theories in election law is in-
escapable.‖4 As Heather Gerken has explained in the context of redis-
tricting, ―[c]ourts cannot decide whether power has been ‗fairly‘ or 
‗properly‘ allocated among voters without having a broader theory of 
how a healthy democracy should function . . . .‖5 The high courts of 
other nations have not shrunk from developing such accounts, or at 
least from making a serious attempt.6 
                                                                                                                  
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999) (describing constitutions as pragmati-
cally necessary means of social coordination). 
 2. In Peter Ordeshook‘s words, ―constitutions define the structure of the ‗normally‘ 
functioning state.‖ PETER C. ORDESHOOK, Some Rules of Constitutional Design, in 
LIBERALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 205 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993). 
 3. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A 
JUST POLITICAL ORDER 13 (2007). 
 4. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1126 
(2005). To similar effect, see Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan 
Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1097, 1099 (2007) (―Structural understanding is a necessary predicate to developing the 
law of democracy . . . .‖); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Elec-
tion Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 521 (2004); Richard H. 
Pildes, Two Conceptions of Rights in Cases Involving Political ―Rights,‖ 34 HOUS. L. REV. 
323, 324 (1997) (courts must have ―some conception of what politics ought to be‖); Yasmin 
Dawood, Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to 
Judicial Review, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 519-23 (2012) (arguing that even judicial reli-
ance on specific, textual individual democratic rights cannot be accomplished satisfactorily 
without some kind of theory of the democratic institutions and processes that give the right 
meaning within the setting of a specific system of democratic governance). 
 5. Gerken, supra note 4, at 521. 
 6. For example, according to Yasmin Dawood, the Supreme Court of Canada ―has 
played an important role in defining Canadian democracy.‖ Yasmin Dawood, Democracy 
and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights under the Charter, 51 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 251, 253 (2013). The Australian High Court has inferred a freedom of political speech 
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 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has long refused to develop a 
general account of how the U.S. Constitution establishes and struc-
tures the democratic politics occurring within the very institutions 
that the Constitution itself creates: ―Members of every generation of 
the Supreme Court‘s Justices have claimed that they have no theory 
about the way democracy should work.‖7 Until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, this refusal had few consequences because the Court did not un-
derstand its power to extend to policing the operation of democratic 
institutions.8 In the Court‘s view, the Constitution did not subject 
democratic politics to judicially enforceable constitutional meta-rules, 
and for judges to attempt to find them in the Constitution exceeded the 
legitimate bounds of the judicial role by asking them not to apply law, 
but ―to choose . . . among competing theories of political philosophy.‖9 
 By 1962, however, the Court changed its view of its own powers, 
and began to intervene regularly—and with increasing impact—in 
the business of deciding the ground rules of democratic politics.10 At 
the same time, the Court continued to refuse to develop an account of 
the constitutionally grounded structure of democratic processes. As a 
result, the Court has over the last five decades decided cases sub-
stantially reshaping the political landscape—eliminating restrictions 
on voting,11 overturning long-established institutions of political rep-
resentation,12 and invalidating regulatory limits on political speech 
and spending13—largely without a compass. 
                                                                                                                  
from sections of the Australian Constitution dealing with representative and responsible 
government. See Nationwide News Ltd. v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.); Australian Capi-
tal Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.). 
 7. Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and 
Richard Briffault’s Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 414 (2001). See also 
Gerken, supra note 4, at 514; Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of 
Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS (David K. Ryden, ed. 2000). 
 8. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
 9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Among 
members of the contemporary Court, Justice Thomas has most explicitly expressed a simi-
lar sentiment: ―[M]atters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judg-
es. And that is precisely the point. The matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote 
dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, not questions of law.‖ Holder v. Hall, 
512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).   
 10. The pivotal case was Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This history is elaborated 
infra Part II. 
 11. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
 12. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 
(1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 13. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club‘s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm‘n, 514 
U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 
265 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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 Scholars have advanced several possible explanations for the 
Court‘s surprising reticence. It has been suggested, for example, that 
the Court avoids attempting to tease out of the Constitution some 
plausible baseline theory of how American democratic politics ought 
to work because the issues are so ―hard to figure out‖14 that the task 
may surpass judicial competence.15 Others argue that judicial devel-
opment of such a theory is properly avoided because the Constitu-
tion‘s indeterminacy on the subject of democratic practices raises un-
acceptable risks that courts might improperly ossify contingent polit-
ical arrangements that are best left fluid, or that judges might rely 
excessively on their personal views of what democracy requires.16 An-
other family of explanations proposes the Court‘s embrace of a mini-
malist approach to judging17 or the justices‘ preference for highly spe-
cific doctrinal formulae couched at low levels of abstraction.18  
 Although there may be a grain of truth to all these explanations, 
in the end they give the Court more credit than it deserves. A close 
and careful look at the precise sequence in which the Court‘s juris-
prudence of democratic process evolved tells a different story, one 
distinctly less appealing on account of the almost complete absence 
from the Court‘s decision making of deliberate judicial choice and re-
flection. What this history shows is not the application of some con-
sistent and coherent judicial philosophy or practice of judging; to the 
contrary, it shows that the Court‘s jurisprudence of democracy ar-
rived at its present unsatisfactory state accidentally, by way of a 
path-dependent sequence of small yet fateful steps.  
 Specifically, the Court‘s lack of a theory of democratic politics in 
its earliest cases left a vacuum at the heart of the constitutional ju-
risprudence of democratic process. Like nature, however, jurispru-
dence abhors a vacuum; cases must be decided somehow, on some 
basis, if decisions are to be taken. I argue here that the Court filled 
its jurisprudential hole not primarily by invoking principles of de-
mocracy–even unstated ones19–or by invoking and following consist-
ently some set of beliefs about the modest role of courts in a democra-
                                                                                                                  
 14. See Gerken, supra note 4, at 508; Gerken, supra note 7, at 421. 
 15. See Kang, supra note 4, at 1099-100; Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 302.  
 16. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 71-72, 139, 153-54 (2003); Lowenstein, 
supra note 7; Luke P. McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election Law, 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 89, 115-16 (2009). 
 17. See Kang, supra note 4, at 1105. On the risks of judicial grand theory, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001). 
 18. See Gerken, supra note 7, at 421-22. 
 19. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 4, at 1114; Gerken, supra note 7, at 414; Kang, supra 
note 4, at 1113 (all arguing that it is impossible for courts to decide cases dealing with 
democratic processes without orienting themselves against some underlying conception of 
democracy, which is thus necessarily present even if unarticulated). 
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cy. Instead, the Court responded to questions about democratic pro-
cess raised in its cases by doing what reluctant decision makers often 
do: by reaching for whatever is handy.20 This reaction took two main 
forms. First, in the absence of a pertinent theory to guide it, the 
Court fell back on habit. Its principal relevant habit, developed in its 
earliest cases dealing with democratic practices, had been to solve 
problems of political power and representation by partitioning the 
electorate—that is, by ordering it subdivided, thereby converting mi-
norities within a jurisdiction into local majorities in a smaller one. By 
resorting to this habit in subsequent cases, the Court soon came to 
treat partitioning as the preferred solution to most problems of dem-
ocratic representation, even where it might be of dubious wisdom. 
 Second, the Court reached for the tools of decision that were most 
ready at hand, and those tools were individual rights. In particular, 
the Court unthinkingly imported an antidiscrimination approach, 
pioneered in cases involving racial discrimination and relying on 
principles of equal protection, into a large number of disputes dealing 
with democratic process, problems for which this approach often was 
not well-suited.21 Later, when the Equal Protection Clause began to 
prove inadequate to the increasingly complex task of regulating polit-
ical processes, the Court began, reflexively, to import other rights 
into the democracy arena, principally the First Amendment protec-
tions of speech and association, which it proceeded to stretch badly by 
applying them in circumstances for which they were not designed. As 
a result, the Court has developed what might plausibly be called a 
jurisprudence of habit and availability when it should have developed 
a jurisprudence of democracy and democratic practice. 
 How the Court reached this point is the story I wish to relate. It 
begins not with modern, frustratingly complex conceptual problems 
of campaign speech and finance, but with very old problems of brute, 
physical territoriality arising from the way human beings distribute 
themselves on the land. Part I therefore reviews briefly the historical 
evolution of the American system of territorial representation, 
demonstrating how a set of institutions initially well-matched to pre-
                                                                                                                  
 20. This behavioral trait is sometimes referred to as an ―availability heuristic.‖ See 
AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973).  
 21. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1216 (1996) (―[T]he Court . . . has . . . created a doctrinal morass by 
selectively wrenching concepts out of the contexts in which they were developed and at-
tempting to jury-rig them to work in a context where they do not make sense . . . .‖); Samu-
el Issacharoff and & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705-06 (1999) (the Court‘s practices have ―led to the recasting of essen-
tially political challenges born of electoral frustration as racial ones‖). 
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vailing political theories and practices came increasingly under pres-
sure as social and political beliefs evolved. Part II examines the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s entry onto this terrain in its early decisions review-
ing the constitutionality of laws regulating democratic representa-
tion. Paying careful attention to the kinds of cases coming before the 
Court and their precise sequence, Part II shows how the Court‘s ear-
liest rulings, in cases involving racial discrimination in politics, es-
tablished a template for judicial intervention that the Court, in path-
dependent fashion, almost immediately applied in other, far less pro-
pitious settings. 
 Part III describes the quick emergence and solidification of the 
Court‘s preference for solving problems of democratic representation 
by partitioning the electorate so as to transform complaining political 
minorities into content, locally dominant majorities. It argues that 
the Court‘s habitual and unthinking reliance on partitioning, un-
moored to any normative conception of who ought to be represented 
in legislative bodies or their appropriate degree of influence, led pre-
dictably to the emergence of one of the most intractable problems in 
contemporary American politics: the Court‘s complete inability to ad-
judicate successfully questions of partisan gerrymandering.  
 Finally, Part IV examines the Court‘s unguided deployment of ge-
neric individual rights to solve problems of democratic process and 
participation, following the Court‘s jurisprudence step by step from 
an initial reliance on equal protection to its expansion into First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. Part IV shows how 
reliance on principles of equal protection, which had served the Court 
well in its early cases involving racial discrimination in politics, be-
gan to cause the Court mounting problems, leading it to turn to the 
freedom of speech, where it ran into even more severe and less trac-
table problems. Ultimately, constrained by a series of path-dependent 
decisions into penetrating ever more deeply into the use of individual 
rights—a commitment from which it apparently saw no possible re-
treat—the Court has continued to press First Amendment rights into 
service to a point well beyond the bounds of logic or necessity, a wide-
ly criticized pattern that continues to this day.  
II.   EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION 
 American institutions of political representation have their roots 
in an English system designed initially to represent land.22 Land-
                                                                                                                  
 22. The argument in this section relies on findings and analysis first set out in James 
A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community [hereinafter 
One Person, One Vote], 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237 (2002), and James A. Gardner, Representation 
Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering 
[hereinafter Representation Without Party], 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (2006). 
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holders in feudal England held their estates under an obligation to 
provide various forms of aid to the crown, including, upon request, 
financial assistance.23 Because financial impositions by tradition 
could not be assessed without the consent of those tenured in the 
lord‘s land, representatives of the land were summoned to Parlia-
ment for the purpose of giving their consent to taxation.24  
 As the rise of commerce expanded the potential sources of wealth 
beyond land, English monarchs sought to tap these new sources of 
royal revenue by expanding Parliament to include representatives 
from corporate towns and boroughs, where merchant wealth was 
mainly to be found.25 Nevertheless, representation in Parliament con-
tinued to be based on the unit from which consent was required, irre-
spective of its actual characteristics, including who or how many 
happened to live there, or even the amount of revenue due from the 
taxable unit.26 By the late fourteenth century, representatives in Par-
liament consisted of two knights from each county and two citizens or 
burgesses from each city or borough within the represented counties, 
regardless of population, wealth, or property value.27  
 This model eventually crossed the Atlantic to the American colo-
nies, where representation in colonial legislatures was allocated not to 
individuals, but to local communities. Thus, in Massachusetts, repre-
sentatives represented towns; in Virginia, plantations, hundreds or 
counties; and in the Carolinas, parishes.28 As the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court said in 1811, ―[t]he right of sending representa-
tives [to the state legislature] is corporate, vested in the town . . . .‖29 
By the time this method of representation became entrenched in the 
colonies, however, its justification had evolved from one based on feu-
dal obligations in land to a more characteristically republican justifica-
tion that presupposed a commonality of interest arising from shared 
characteristics of the inhabitants of represented units: 
The corporate method of representation presumed that physical 
proximity generated communal sentiment. Each geographic unit 
was thought to be an organic, cohesive community, whose resi-
                                                                                                                  
 23. See M.V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 253 (1964). 
 24. See G.L. HARRISS, The Formation of Parliament, 1272-1377, in THE ENGLISH 
PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 41 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981); WILLIAM 
STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
199-202 (1880). 
 25. See A.F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 51-55 (1920); STUBBS, supra 
note 24, at 210. 
 26. For a thorough discussion of medieval taxation policies, see G.L. HARRISS, KING, 
PARLIAMENT, AND PUBLIC FINANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND TO 1369 (1975). 
 27. See A.L. Brown, Parliament, c. 1377-1422, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 117-18 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981). 
 28. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 41 (1988). 
 29. In re Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523, 526 (1811).  
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dents knew one another, held common values, and shared compat-
ible economic interests. The smaller the community, the more like-
ly that its citizens would identify with one another . . . . Large dis-
tances, in contrast, bred a diversity of peoples and values.30 
 By the time of the Revolution, the founding generation fully ac-
cepted this account of representation. The idea that the political in-
terests of communal groups of individuals correlated strongly with 
territory served, for example, as an axiom in Madison‘s famous de-
fense of the large republic in Federalist 10.31 ―Factious combinations,‖ 
Madison argued, are ―less to be dreaded‖ in a large republic than in a 
small one because of the greater variety of interests found among a 
larger populace, a characteristic that is entirely an artifact of geo-
graphical scale: ―Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety 
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of 
the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens . . . .‖32 The idea that territorially defined local communities 
may reliably serve as proxies for the shared, collective interests of 
the individuals who inhabit them has remained a fixture in American 
political thought ever since.33 So, for example, among delegates to the 
Wisconsin constitutional convention of 1851, ―[t]he leading idea 
seems to have been that each county was regarded in the nature of ‗a 
small republic,‘ or ‗in the light of a family,‘ and ‗each organized coun-
ty had a separate interest.‘ ‖34 In its more modern incarnation, the 
belief that place and interest coincide centers on the idea of the 
―community of interest,‖ a term widely used in federal reapportion-
ment jurisprudence.35  
 Nevertheless, it is not immediately self-evident why the inhabit-
ants of any particular locality should comprise a community of inter-
est. Why should mere common habitation of a unit of local govern-
ment reflect, or give rise to, a community of interest among the resi-
dents? The answer to this question was gradually worked out by 
American state courts, which typically offered two distinct, though 
not unrelated theories. First, the inhabitants of a county or similar 
                                                                                                                  
 30. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1776-1850 (1987), at 37-38. See also ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF 
CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 72-77 (2005). 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
 32. Id.  
 33. For a strong critique of this phenomenon, see THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 4-8 (1978). 
 34. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 739 (Wis. 1892) (Pin-
ney, J., concurring), (quoting JOURNAL OF DEBATES 219-24 (1851)).  
 35. E.g., Lawyer v. Dep‘t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 919 (1995); Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1999); Bar-
nett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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local government unit were said to share a common local economy 
and economic life; second, county residents were said to participate 
together in the public life of a shared unit of political and governmen-
tal administration.36 
 The linkage in the state constitutional jurisprudence between 
counties as the basic constitutional unit of representation and the 
shared economic life of county residents has never been expressed 
more clearly than in a 1964 opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
Anciently, and still today, the counties reflect different economic 
interests, although of course these economic interests are not per-
fectly contained or separated by any political line, municipal, 
county or State. So, certain counties have a dominant concern 
with manufacturing and commerce; others have a large stake in 
agriculture; still others lean heavily upon the resort industry; 
and finally a few counties have a special interest in the products 
of the sea.37 
The idea here, clearly, is that counties are not arbitrary territorial 
units, random shapes on a map, to be ignored or rearranged on a 
whim, but rather contain populations that have distinctive interests, 
and these interests are primarily economic; each county, that is to 
say, comprises a distinct local economy.  
 At the same time, American state courts also have frequently 
found that residency in a county creates what might be called an 
―administrative‖ community of interest among the inhabitants in vir-
tue of their common experience of the county‘s administration of gov-
ernmental programs.38 Finally, state courts have sometimes found 
that common participation by a county‘s inhabitants in its electoral 
politics, and in the reciprocal relationships established between those 
inhabitants and their elected officials, gives rise to a political com-
munity of interest entitled to recognition.39  
 For much of American history the activities of state legislatures 
conformed largely to this model. During the colonial period, the mat-
ters that individual legislators brought to state legislature were ―ba-
sically the business of their fellow townsmen,‖ and the legislative 
                                                                                                                  
 36. This argument is worked out in greater detail in Gardner, Representation without 
Party, supra note 22, at 939. 
 37. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964).  
 38. On the role of counties in state government, see, for example, In re Legislative 
Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (Md. 2002), and Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 
S.E.2d 377, 385-86 (N.C. 2002). 
 39. See, e.g., Stephenson, 562 S.E.2d at 386; Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 110 (Va. 
2002); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor and W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 
323, 330 (Vt. 1993). 
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agenda was set essentially by petitions from towns and individuals.40 
This changed surprisingly little over the course of the nineteenth 
century. During much of that period, state legislatures ―spent most of 
their time responding to highly specialized demands like divorces or 
the settlement of local disputes and land titles.‖41 In mid-nineteenth-
century Maryland, for example, no more than ten percent of state 
legislation took up matters affecting the entire polity, whereas more 
than half of state laws affected only specific local communities and 
groups, and one-third provided some kind of benefit to specific indi-
viduals.42 Legislative politics was thus conceived primarily as an are-
na for satisfying demands made by communities and individuals, not 
as one for taking up universally applicable programmatic initiatives, 
much less for adjudicating among competing conceptions of collective 
life or governance. 
 The point of all this is to suggest that until at least the early 
twentieth century American political institutions and prevailing the-
ories of politics suited each other rather well, reflecting a largely re-
publican set of political beliefs implemented by largely compatible 
institutions. In this environment, where representatives were under-
stood to represent territorially-defined interests, most problems with 
representation could therefore be solved by territorial partitioning of 
the electorate. For example, one of the most common complaints 
about inadequate representation during the nineteenth century arose 
from westward migration: the appearance of newly settled communi-
ties gave rise to demands for formal legal recognition and the legisla-
tive representation that came with it.43 Legislative carving of a new 
town or county from previously recognized territorial communities 
thus provided a complete and appropriate solution to the problem: 
newly-formed communities entitled to legislative representation 
achieved the recognition they were due, and the new town or county 
could then become a player in the competitive processes of obtaining 
central legislative favors and gaining access to centrally controlled 
resources. 
 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the 
ground began to shift. First, traditionally republican conceptions of 
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politics began to be displaced by increasingly influential utilitarian 
theories.44 Unlike traditional republicanism, which presupposed or-
ganic and enduring linkages between place, community, and interest, 
utilitarianism argued that interests were both individual and highly 
contingent, and therefore unpredictable.45 What pleased a person was 
a matter of personal taste, and a person‘s taste was a priori no more 
likely to be satisfied by one thing than by another.46 Place and com-
munity were thus knocked off their pedestal and demoted to a level of 
equality with all other potential consumption values. In politics, this 
meant that the political cleavages that individuals found most salient 
could just as easily revolve around occupation, social class, ideology, 
clan, or any of a host of other factors, as around the traditional center 
of gravity of local community.  
 By the mid-twentieth century, political scientists had appropri-
ated this new understanding by constructing influential and dis-
tinctly anti-republican models of political pluralism.47 These models 
rejected a conception of citizenship as revolving around the pursuit 
of republican virtue and replaced it with one stressing the pursuit 
of self-interest.48 By the same token, they also rejected a static con-
ception of politics as jostling among fixed communities in favor of a 
conception of politics as a fluid, constantly evolving competition 
among shifting groups organized around contingently salient inter-
ests of the moment.49 
 The rise of Progressivism during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries launched a second kind of attack on traditional 
republican institutions. Progressives argued that corruption in poli-
tics was pervasive; that the rich and powerful unduly dominated, for 
their own benefit, the inherited institutions of politics; and that citi-
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zens, though retaining in theory the capacity to control existing insti-
tutions of government for the public good, had permitted themselves 
to be distracted by objectively irrelevant distinctions of family, 
neighborhood, and ethnicity.50 Progressives consequently mounted a 
sustained attack on the inherited institutional structure, seeking to 
replace existing institutions with others they believed more condu-
cive to popular pursuit of rational self-governance in the public inter-
est.51 This movement was in many respects extremely successful. 
Progressives won widespread adoption of measures designed to make 
voting more rational, such as the secret ballot and the short ballot; to 
enhance popular control of government, such as primary elections, 
initiatives, referenda, recall, direct election of U.S. Senators, and fe-
male suffrage; and to reduce the role of partisanship in governance, 
such as the city manager and commission forms of local government, 
nonpartisanship, and at-large elections.52 With the exception of direct 
election of Senators and the extension of the vote to women, however, 
all the significant institutional reforms occurred at the state and lo-
cal levels; the institutions of democratic politics at the national level 
remained firmly in place. 
 Lastly, by the mid-twentieth century, popular tolerance for racial 
exclusions from democratic life waned substantially in most of the 
country. The civil rights movement focused much of its effort on 
breaking down racial barriers to voter registration and balloting, 
achieving a modest initial success in the federal Civil Rights Act of 
1957, followed by what would turn out to be a transformational victo-
ry in the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).53  
 All these developments—the eclipse of republicanism, the Pro-
gressive reform movement, and the evolution of attitudes concerning 
race—created serious tensions in the political environment. Existing 
institutions of democratic politics came increasingly to be seen as out 
of step with, and inhospitable to, prevailing beliefs about democracy 
and democratic practice. It was into this frothing cauldron that the 
Supreme Court finally inserted itself. 
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III.   THE SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE FIELD 
 For a long time, the Supreme Court did not concern itself with 
questions involving the structure or regulation of political practices. 
For much of American history, opportunities for federal judicial in-
tervention simply did not arise. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
much of political life was left to private self-regulation. Political par-
ties formed freely, selected candidates by processes of their own 
choosing, printed their own ballots, and ran campaigns free from 
governmental oversight.54 Such election law as existed was almost 
entirely at the state level, making it a matter for state courts, not 
federal ones.55 Indeed, the U.S. Constitution expressly grants to 
states the authority to regulate federal congressional and presiden-
tial elections.56 
 The Supreme Court, moreover, had long taken the position that 
democratic processes generally, and questions of political representa-
tion in particular, were not the business of the federal courts. In a 
pivotal 1946 ruling, a plurality of the Court ruled malapportionment 
a nonjusticiable political question, warned against judicial entry into 
a ―political thicket,‖ and decreed that the only remedy for defects in 
political representation lay in voluntary legislative action to correct 
it.57 The entire panoply of Progressive reforms was implemented, af-
ter all, not by judicial intervention, but by legislative action taken in 
the wake of a highly successful process of political mobilization. 
 Eventually, however, profound shifts in the social and political 
environment produced tensions that became too much for the Court 
to bear, and its resolve to stay out of democratic processes crumbled. 
As I shall describe shortly, this occurred first in a limited way in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960),58 and then more broadly in Baker v. 
Carr (1962),59 until by the time it decided Buckley v. Valeo (1976),60 
the Court was not only heavily involved, but routinely altering the 
political landscape. This pattern has only continued with decisions 
such as Bush v. Gore (2000),61 Citizens United v. FEC (2010),62 and, 
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most recently, Shelby County v. Holder (2013)63 and McCutcheon v. 
FEC (2014).64 
 The Court‘s first significant ruling of the modern era in the field of 
democratic process was Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960),65 a case that fol-
lowed closely on the heels, both in time and in subject matter, of per-
haps its most important ruling of the twentieth century, Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954),66 in which the Court ordered an end to ra-
cial segregation in public schools. Gomillion concerned a law, enacted 
by the Alabama Legislature at the request of the City of Tuskegee, 
that altered the boundaries of the city from a perfect square to a me-
andering 28-sided polygon. After this boundary change, every white 
resident of Tuskegee still lived within the city, while virtually all of its 
black residents found themselves outside it.67 In a gnostic opinion that 
laid out more clearly the justices‘ horror at this racial gerrymander 
than their legal reasoning, the Court invalidated the law as an in-
fringement of the right to vote on the basis of race in contravention of 
the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.68 
 That Gomillion got things started turns out to have been unfortu-
nate in a way; although the case established a template for adjudica-
tion that the Court has followed ever since, it is a template that turns 
out not to be very useful outside the arena of naked racial discrimi-
nation. One way in which Gomillion got things off to a poor start is 
that it involves political exclusion in the most literal sense—through 
the drawing of boundaries to partition, and by partitioning to exclude 
one portion of, the electorate. Although the case might have been 
framed as raising questions about the practice of partitioning itself, it 
was framed instead in a way that assumed the legitimacy of parti-
tioning but treated this particular partition as illicit. As a result, the 
Court was immediately cast in the role of policing the practice of par-
titioning the electorate, rather than examining the practice itself on 
its merits, or inquiring into alternative ways to structure democratic 
representation that might more directly address the problems of ra-
cial exclusion from democratic life. 
 This was especially unfortunate because the racial gerrymander-
ing undertaken in Gomillion represented an extremely unusual form 
of racial exclusion from democratic participation. Most forms of race-
based political exclusion in the United States have not involved the 
creation of formal geographical boundaries; they have involved in-
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stead the application of law, force, and social pressure to exclude 
members of an existing community from participating in that com-
munity‘s own democratic practices.69 They create, in other words, in-
terior boundaries within a society, not reified, external boundaries 
formally fencing out the disfavored populations.  
 Second, the gerrymander in Gomillion was undertaken only when 
more common forms of racial exclusion and suppression had been 
deemed unpromising. Tuskegee had been since 1881 the home of the 
Tuskegee Institute (now Tuskegee University), which by the 1950s 
was an unusually successful, well-regarded, and well-funded black 
college.70 During that era, the typical method of first resort in the 
American South to exclude blacks from participation in a communi-
ty‘s political life was the literacy test.71 Testing literacy, however, did 
not recommend itself as a way to exclude black voters associated with 
the Tuskegee Institute, many of whom held a Ph.D., and were gener-
ally far better educated than the city‘s white population.72 The re-
drawing of the town‘s borders to move the Institute and its faculty, 
staff, and students outside the town was thus an atypical measure of 
some desperation. Additionally, unlike most other forms of political 
and social exclusion of blacks, the boundary drawing was not only 
readily observable, but susceptible essentially to res ipsa loquitur 
proof of racial animus—no other plausible explanation could account 
for it.73  
 Finally, the pattern established in Gomillion included deployment 
of an individual right to solve a problem of democratic practice. The 
Fifteenth Amendment was available, ready-at-hand, had previously 
been used by the Court in a few earlier cases,74 and seemed tailor-
made for the kind of problem presented by the Tuskegee racial ger-
rymander. As a result, the Court gave no thought—and in fairness 
really did not need to give any thought—to larger, more systemic 
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questions concerning appropriate patterns of representation and 
democratic political life. 
 Despite the very unusual circumstances of Gomillion, the pattern 
pioneered there was soon applied outside the setting of racial dis-
crimination in a case that went a long way toward cementing it.75 In 
Baker v. Carr (1962),76 decided just two years after Gomillion, the 
Court took up the problem of legislative malapportionment, in which 
legislative election districts contain grossly disparate numbers of vot-
ers. In a decision that changed the course of American democracy, 
the Court reversed its earlier position and held that district popula-
tion disparities present a justiciable question of constitutional law 
under the Equal Protection Clause.77  
 Garden-variety malapportionment does not present problems of 
either race or exclusion. Everyone in a malapportioned district is en-
titled to vote and to participate fully in politics, and may do so on an 
equal footing with everyone else in the district.78 If malapportion-
ment harms processes of political representation, it does so by opera-
tion of some defect other than outright exclusion. Upon taking up 
this problem for the first time, the Court could have dealt with it by 
deriving or advancing a constitutionally grounded theory of represen-
tation. It might have held, for instance, that malapportionment vio-
lates some aspect of the way popular sovereignty is meant to work. It 
could have taken the position, on a kind of pluralist or agency view, 
that malapportionment erects a barrier to some contemplated degree 
of government responsiveness to public opinion. Or it might even 
have invoked a more traditional, republican theory of disenfran-
chisement of communities, understood as territorially defined popula-
tions or as territorially defined interests of groups of co-residents. 
 Instead, the Court approached the problem of malapportionment 
using the Gomillion model. It reached for the most readily available 
tool—an individual right, the Equal Protection Clause79—thereby 
forcing the case into the mold of an intervention designed to thwart 
discrimination. But who was discriminating against whom? In the 
Court‘s view, elaborated in later cases, the discrimination effectuated 
by malapportionment was discrimination in favor of sparsely popu-
lated rural areas at the expense of densely populated urban ones.80 
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As in Gomillion, the Court again cast itself not as inquiring into the 
propriety of partitioning of the electorate as a way of organizing polit-
ical representation, but as policing the practice of partitioning, the 
legitimacy of which was assumed, and the basis of which was not  
examined. 
 Two years later, in the seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims (1964),81 
the Court used the new, individual rights lever it identified in Baker 
to effectuate perhaps the most sweeping change in American demo-
cratic practice since adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments fol-
lowing the conclusion of the Civil War. In Reynolds, the Court for the 
first time applied the equal protection remedy identified in Baker to 
the apportionment of state legislatures.82 In a far-reaching decision, 
the Court held that population disparities among legislative districts 
violated the right to vote of individuals in overpopulated districts, 
and that a constitutionally mandated rule of one person, one vote ap-
plied to both houses of bicameral state legislatures.83  
 The impact of this decision cannot be overstated. At a stroke, it 
placed a core feature of a historically decentralized system of repre-
sentation under central control and destroyed the long-standing 
structural framework instituting political representation on the ba-
sis of place and local community. After Reynolds, institutions for-
merly aimed at achieving representation of communities—of inhab-
ited places—were required to be based instead on shifting, equi-
populous groupings of placeless individuals.84 The Court thus dis-
carded the theory of representation that had long prevailed in the 
states, not only invalidating it, but deeming it incompatible with 
what the Court now announced to be constitutionally-grounded no-
tions of equal citizenship.85  
 Although Reynolds precipitated wide-ranging and doubtless bene-
ficial changes in the balance of political power across the nation,86 it 
established a poor pattern for judicial involvement in the realm of 
democratic practice.87 First, the Court did not advance any affirma-
tive theory of political representation; its only theory was negative in 
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the sense that certain practices—in fact, the old, prevailing practic-
es—were invalid. Second, the Court‘s establishment of equal protec-
tion as the tool of choice outside the racial context, without a theory 
of democratic practice and participation to guide its application, was 
especially problematic. Equal protection outcomes tend to be parasit-
ic on underlying substantive values.88 One cannot know whether a 
person is being treated unequally in any way that counts without 
first knowing whether that person has a substantive entitlement to 
the thing he or she has been denied in equal measure, and whether a 
person has such an entitlement is a question not of equality, but of 
desert.89 By applying equal protection to democratic practices without 
first specifying the underlying substantive values that are implicated 
by democratic participation, the Court thus founded its democratic 
jurisprudence on shifting and unstable ground.  
 In particular, as Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent, the Court 
specified neither how much influence citizens should have in a de-
mocracy, nor even the outer parameters of what such influence might 
reasonably be, nor yet any framework within which to think about 
these questions.90 As a result, equal protection outcomes in democra-
cy cases are consistent with a wide array of outcomes that cannot be 
narrowed except by invoking some antecedent theory of democracy or 
democratic authority.91 Unfortunately, the Court failed to specify 
what that theory is—it did not indicate, in other words, the proper 
baseline of comparison for deciding whether democratic influence has 
been improperly and unequally withheld.92 This lacuna has ever since 
confounded the coherence and utility of constitutional oversight of 
the political process, and raised many problems that still plague the 
jurisprudence. 
 The next two sections focus on two of the most notable problems 
arising from the template for judicial intervention developed by the 
Supreme Court in these early cases: its reflexive resort to partition-
ing of the electorate as a remedy for perceived democratic wrongs or 
imperfections; and its unthinking deployment of an individual 
rights model. 
IV.   PERFECTIBILITY THROUGH PARTITIONING 
 In cases involving democratic practice in which groups have been 
excluded or mistreated, the Supreme Court has from the beginning of 
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its modern jurisprudence displayed a distinct preference for solutions 
that rely on partitioning the jurisdiction over those that rely on en-
hancing participation and engagement within the jurisdiction. That 
is, where members of some group complain that their desire to be-
come full participants in the political life of their community has 
been thwarted by some officially created obstacle, the Court has pre-
ferred not to dwell on ways in which the complaining group might be 
more fully integrated into existing democratic structures and practic-
es. Instead, it has tended to solve these problems by partitioning the 
jurisdiction in such a way as to make the complaining minority into a 
local majority.  
 An early, important, and in many ways typical example of this 
approach is White v. Regester (1973).93 In Regester, black and Chicano 
populations of two large, metropolitan counties in Texas complained 
that they had been unconstitutionally excluded from effective partic-
ipation in the congressional politics of their jurisdictions.94 The claim 
involved many moving parts. The plaintiffs complained that they had 
been victims of a long history of official discrimination in political 
affairs; that local party processes of choosing candidates were con-
trolled by whites who did not pay sufficient attention to minority 
communities; that racially divisive campaign tactics had been de-
ployed routinely in white areas; and that, in the case of the Mexican-
American plaintiffs, cultural and language barriers and restrictive 
voter registration practices significantly impeded their political effec-
tiveness.95 In light of these background conditions, the plaintiffs fo-
cused their objections on a specific institutional choice made by the 
state: its decision to use in these counties large, multimember con-
gressional districts and a place system, in which all candidates ran 
at-large for specific seats.96 Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued, the 
combination of underlying discrimination and the specific institu-
tional choice created conditions in which it was virtually impossible 
for members of these groups to participate effectively in local con-
gressional politics.97 
 The Court understood these claims perfectly, casting them as chal-
lenges to effective participation in democratic processes:  
The plaintiffs‘ burden is to produce evidence to support findings 
that the political processes leading to nomination and election 
were not equally open to participation by the group in question–
that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in 
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the district to participate in the political processes and to elect leg-
islators of their choice.98 
Relying on an examination of ―the totality of the circumstances,‖99 the 
Court held that the plaintiffs had met their evidentiary burden, 
showing that they had been ―effectively excluded‖ and were ―general-
ly not permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable and 
meaningful manner.‖100  
 When it came to the remedy, however, the Court made a bizarre 
leap of logic. If the constitutional problem consisted of barriers to 
participation, then we might expect the remedy to focus on how to 
lower those barriers and integrate the plaintiff groups effectively into 
the mainstream of political life in those jurisdictions. Instead, the 
Court ordered the multimember districts broken up into single-
member districts in at least one of which the complaining minority 
groups would, presumably, become local majorities.101 Somehow, the 
Court suggested, this partitioning of aggrieved minority groups into 
smaller districts that they could independently control would ―bring 
the community into the full stream of political life of the county and 
State.‖102 Yet partitioning is the antithesis of overcoming exclusion 
from participation; it is in fact a different, and in some ways a more 
extreme, form of exclusion: it takes the complaining group out of the 
offending jurisdiction and creates a new one in which the group in 
question no longer has to worry about—much less to engage and 
work with—the larger group that had previously excluded it.103 Cer-
tainly, the Court gave no thought to the fact that partitioning the 
electorate creates new minorities within the newly formed majority-
minority districts, or whether the harm of exclusion from participa-
tion might now be shifted to such other groups.104  
 Since Regester, the solution of partitioning has been applied rou-
tinely in many contexts. Where at-large systems have been used for 
discriminatory purposes, division of the multimember jurisdiction 
into equipopulous districts has long been the Court‘s remedy of choice 
                                                                                                                  
 98. Id. at 766. 
 99. Id. at 769. 
 100. Id. at 767. 
 101. See id. at 769.  
 102. Id.  
 103. See Kathryn Abrams, ―Raising Politics Up‖: Minority Political Participation and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988). But see LANI GUINIER, THE 
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 82 
(1994) (arguing that inclusion alone may be futile if it leads to token representation and con-
sistent outvoting, and arguing for alternation in power as an alternative to partitioning). 
 104. Aleinikoff and Issacharoff call these groups ―filler people.‖ T. Alexander Aleinikoff 
& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 588 (1993). For a well-known example, see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, 
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
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in constitutional cases.105 It is also the Court‘s remedy of choice in cas-
es arising under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA, per-
haps the most significant American civil rights legislation ever enact-
ed, implements the Fifteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in voting. Section 2(b) of the Act, using language lifted di-
rectly from the Supreme Court‘s opinion in White v. Regester, provides:  
A violation . . . of this section is established if, based on the totality 
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens pro-
tected by [this statute] in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.106 
The statute thus defines an offense in terms of harm to ―parti-
cipation . . . in the political process.‖107 Yet in Thornburg v. Gingles 
(1986),108 its leading decision on the treatment under the VRA of mul-
timember districts, the Supreme Court ruled that the preferred rem-
edy for denials of participation is not removal of barriers to participa-
tion within such districts, but the destruction of multimember dis-
tricts by partitioning the electorate into single-member districts such 
that the protected minority is awarded control of one or more of the 
new districts. 
 The Court‘s habitual resort to partitioning might be perfectly co-
herent were it led to this remedy by some theory of representation or 
of democratic process. In fact, however, it has no such theory, and 
this has produced some significant, persistent problems in the juris-
prudence. First, the Court‘s lack of an underlying theory leaves un-
answered a host of important questions. For example, the act of par-
titioning the electorate into subgroups necessarily involves decisions 
about who will have the ability to control an election district, and 
consequently about who will obtain effective representation in the 
legislature. Yet without a theory of representation we cannot know 
who or what is properly represented in a legislature, and thus cannot 
                                                                                                                  
 105. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 
333 (1973); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551 (1972); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 
692 (1971).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. A Senate Report accompanying the legislation listed numerous factors that 
might help establish the requisite harm to political participation, including a history of 
official discrimination in voting; the existence in the jurisdiction of racially polarized vot-
ing; the use of electoral procedures that enhance the opportunity for discrimination; denial 
of access to candidate slating processes; depressed political participation on account of past 
discrimination in education or employment; racial appeals during campaigns; and the lack 
of election of minorities to office in the jurisdiction. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 
44-45 (1986). 
 108. 478 U.S. at 50. 
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make principled decisions about which ways of subdividing the elec-
torate are appropriate and which are not.109  
 An example of how these kinds of problems can arise is afforded 
by Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 (1969).110 That case 
concerned the validity of a New York law that limited eligibility to 
vote in school board elections to parents of school-age children and 
those who owned or rented taxable property in the district.111 The 
purpose of the law clearly was to confine the school board electorate 
to those who had some direct or indirect stake in its activities—
parents had an interest in the education of their children, and own-
ers and renters of taxable property had an interest in the activities of 
the school board because it levied school taxes within the district.112 
The plaintiff, who lived rent-free in his parents‘ house and was thus 
ineligible under the statute to vote, claimed his right to vote had 
been infringed.113 The Court agreed,114 but the basis and significance 
of its ruling is unclear. It did not offer any theory (or if ―theory‖ is too 
fancy a term, any ―account‖) of who might be entitled to representa-
tion on an elected legislative body, and on what basis. Nor did it sug-
gest that universal suffrage is a constitutional default rule. Instead, 
the Court ―express[ed] no opinion‖115 as to whether the state might 
legitimately restrict the franchise to those who are most directly in-
terested in or affected by governmental actions, but struck down the 
statute on the ground that it did not advance with sufficient precision 
the state‘s asserted justifications, whether or not they were constitu-
tionally valid.116 The ruling thus clarifies nothing. 
 Another example is the eye-opening result in Holt Civic Club v. 
City of Tuscaloosa (1978).117 Under Alabama law, cities were permit-
ted to extend the reach of their laws beyond municipal boundaries to 
unincorporated areas located up to three miles outside city limits.118 
Tuscaloosa exercised this option to extend many of its ordinances and 
regulations to the nearby town of Holt.119 Under the statute, however, 
Tuscaloosa was not obliged to offer the residents of Holt an oppor-
tunity to vote for Tuscaloosa‘s city council or mayor.120 As a result, 
                                                                                                                  
 109. REHFELD, supra note 30, at 199. 
 110. See 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 111. Id. at 622. 
 112. Id. at 631. 
 113. Id. at 624-25.  
 114. Id. at 633. 
 115. Id. at 632. 
 116. See id. at 632-33. 
 117. See 439 U.S. 60 (1978). 
 118. Id. at 62. 
 119. Id. at 61-62. 
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Holt residents were subject to laws in the making of which they had 
no voice—a kind of virtual representation soundly repudiated by the 
American Revolution.121 The Court nevertheless upheld this govern-
ance arrangement on the ground that Holt residents did not live in 
Tuscaloosa,122 once again failing to buttress its ruling with any ac-
count of who is entitled to representation on legislative bodies, and in 
what circumstances. One might well ask, for example, why residents 
of Holt, Alabama, were not entitled to representation on a city council 
that made laws directly binding on them while Mr. Kramer was enti-
tled to representation on a local school board that made laws directly 
governing the behavior only of others. It may not be necessary for a 
constitution to provide detailed answers to every question about rep-
resentation that might arise, but to the extent there is slack in the 
system, it seems important to know the range of discretion invested 
in legislatures to define the basis of their own representation.123 
 A second problem arising from the Court‘s habitual resort to parti-
tioning despite its lack of a theory of democratic practice or represen-
tation is what might be called ―partitioning anxiety.‖ Without any 
underlying theory of democratically legitimate representation, parti-
tioning is essentially unguided, and the only way corrections to exist-
ing arrangements can be made is ad hoc, based on distaste for par-
ticular representation schemes. This has led to occasional judicial 
anxiety about the impact of partitioning.  
 A clear example of this is the Court‘s decisions in a line of cases 
beginning with Shaw v. Reno (1993).124 As explained above, the VRA, 
as construed by the Court, in some circumstances requires states to 
partition the electorate so as to give blacks and other protected popu-
lations a substantial degree of control over an appropriate number of 
election districts.125 States got the message, and proceeded to com-
ply.126 Having set this pattern in motion, however, the Court soon be-
gan to exhibit a case of severe anxiety.  
                                                                                                                  
 121. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (Harvard Univ. Press 4th ed.1967). 
 122. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 70. 
 123. See James A. Gardner, How to Do Things with Boundaries: Redistricting and the 
Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399, 417-18 (2012) (arguing that constitutional-
ized norms of democracy can be adequately regulated by defining a range of permissible 
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 124. 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993). See also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); 
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Lawyer v. Dep‘t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); 
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 125. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
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ACT 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994). 
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 Shaw v. Reno concerned the constitutionality of a tortuous district 
drawn by North Carolina for the purpose of sweeping up black popu-
lations in different parts of the state in sufficient numbers to give 
them political control of a congressional district.127 The state drew the 
district for no purpose other than to comply with the VRA.128 Yet the 
Court found the shape of the district too ―bizarre,‖129 and the state‘s 
reliance on race as the operative criterion for partitioning voters too 
single-minded, causing it to invalidate the district as racially discrim-
inatory under the Equal Protection Clause.130 In so doing, the Court 
placed states in the impossible position of attempting to walk a fine 
line, the location of which remained obscure: on one hand, a state vio-
lated the VRA if it did not try hard enough to provide racial minori-
ties with districts they could control; on the other, a state violated the 
Equal Protection Clause if it tried too hard.131 
 All this is a direct and predictable consequence of the Court‘s in-
sistence that the electorate be partitioned coupled with its refusal to 
supply any guidance as to what kind of representation a partitioned 
electorate ought to enjoy. Having demanded the creation of majority-
minority districts, the Court balked at the implications of its own re-
quirement, and its instruction to states amounted more or less to the 
following directive: partition, but not like this. The only thing the 
Court has done since then to make things easier for states engaged in 
redistricting is its recent invalidation of a significant provision of the 
VRA in Shelby County v. Holder (2013).132 Following that ruling, 
states need be much less fearful of liability under the VRA, leaving 
them to fear realistically only liability under the Equal Protection 
Clause, a more difficult kind of case for plaintiffs to prove up.133 Nev-
ertheless, the ruling does nothing to clarify how states ought to draw 
election districts. 
 But perhaps the most serious problem arising from the Court‘s 
heavy reliance on partitioning to solve problems of democratic pro-
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 128. Id. at 634. 
 129. Id. at 644, 655-56. 
 130. See id. at 642-45. 
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 133. Proof of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intentional 
discrimination, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), whereas proof of a violation of 
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cess is that it leads political actors to focus not on the fairness or con-
tent of political processes within a district, but on acquisition of tacti-
cal control over the boundaries of districts.134 In the world the Court 
has helped to create, democracy is constructed not only by processes 
of voice and mutual engagement within a jurisdiction, but also by 
manipulating who is in and who is out of that jurisdiction. The route 
to success in politics thus often lies less in offering a set of normative 
commitments attractive enough to appeal to voters than in sending 
one‘s opponents into exile by partitioning them out of the territory.  
 This problem plagues American democracy. It manifests itself 
most often in persistently contentious processes of redistricting in 
which political actors contest for power unguided by transparent and 
binding legal principles.135 Lacking constitutionally grounded stand-
ards they are required to respect, redistricting authorities typically 
fall back on coarse imperatives of power and partisanship. Redistrict-
ing thus is treated not as an occasion to bring democratic practice 
into conformity with democratic ideals—which remain unspecified—
but as an opportunity to cement temporary partisan advantage into 
place for the next ten years until a new census is taken and the pro-
cess repeats itself. 
V.   AVAILABILITY: THE UNGUIDED DEPLOYMENT OF 
GENERIC INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
 As explained above, the Court‘s reluctance to develop a constitu-
tionally-grounded account of the norms that structure and guide 
American democratic processes created a vacuum at the heart of its 
jurisprudence of democratic practice, a vacuum that, inevitably, had 
to be filled with something. The previous section demonstrated how 
the Court filled this vacuum in part by falling back on habitual forms 
of problem-solving by reflexively deploying partitioning of the elec-
torate as the standard treatment for a host of democratic ills. This 
part describes another way in which the Court filled the vacuum left 
by its refusal to specify a constitutional theory of democratic practice: 
by reaching for the handiest and most readily available tool— though 
not necessarily the most appropriate one—to resolve constitutional 
challenges to the democratic legal order. That tool was individual 
rights.136 
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A.   The Reign of Equal Protection 
 For about two decades, the Court‘s main tool for resolving disputes 
over democratic practices and processes was the Equal Protection 
Clause. Following Baker v. Carr and subsequent one person, one vote 
cases, the Court routinely turned to equal protection in dozens of cas-
es involving challenges to franchise restrictions,137 malapportion-
ment,138 restrictions on ballot access,139 regulation of political par-
ties,140 and many other issues. Yet outside of cases involving obvious 
racial discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause was not well suit-
ed to carry the burden of the Court‘s reliance.  
 The Equal Protection Clause is clearly useful in cases challenging 
official racial discrimination in democratic processes because redress-
ing racial discrimination is what the Clause was principally designed 
to achieve. Moreover, the fact that principles of equality are generally 
parasitic on underlying substantive norms—their application, in oth-
er words, depends upon the existence of an independently supplied 
normative baseline141—does not pose a problem in cases of racial dis-
crimination for the obvious reason that the Constitution itself clearly 
and emphatically establishes such a normative baseline: purposeful 
racial discrimination is not to be tolerated in any official endeavor.142 
 The Equal Protection Clause, however, is much less useful for re-
solving problems of democracy that do not present claims of racial 
discrimination. Its limited suitability to resolving such claims is per-
haps most clearly revealed by the awkward gyrations the Court was 
forced to undergo simply to find the Clause applicable to the most 
basic controversies involving voting. In these cases, what the Court 
wanted was a constitutional right to vote. On its face, this presented 
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a problem: the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant in any pro-
vision a right to vote in federal elections,143 and indeed it incorporates 
as the criterion of eligibility to vote in federal elections whatever 
standards states have chosen to adopt for eligibility to vote in their 
own legislative elections.144 Thus, as the Court has said on more than 
one occasion, ―the Constitution . . . does not confer the right of suf-
frage upon any one . . . .‖145  
 Still, a constitution may be found to confer rights by means other 
than express enumeration.146 The Court might, for example, have in-
ferred the existence of a right to vote from the structure and purpose 
of the Constitution‘s many provisions establishing representative 
democracy.147 Doing so, though, would presumably have forced the 
Court to acknowledge that the Constitution implicitly establishes 
some principles of democratic self-rule, something it has not wished 
to do. To avoid doing so, the Court chose instead to find the right to 
vote buried awkwardly in the Equal Protection Clause. It conse-
quently ruled that although the U.S. Constitution does not oblige a 
state to allow anyone in particular to vote, once a state chooses to 
extend the franchise to anyone at all, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that individuals be permitted to participate in elections ―on 
an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has 
adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any 
segment of the State‘s population.‖148 Thus, bizarrely, the right to 
vote came to be lodged in a provision that does not speak of voting; 
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does not confer on its own a right to vote; and cannot itself supply a 
normative decision principle for resolving disputes about the proper 
extent of the right to vote. 
 This latter problem, at least, could have been solved were the 
Court willing to supply a principle of decision by extracting from the 
Constitution some theory about what the vote is for and why, and in 
what circumstances, citizens are entitled to have it. As we have seen, 
however, this is precisely what the Court declines to do. As a result, 
equal protection analysis in the area of voting rights becomes un-
moored and haphazard as the Court searches for, or lurches between, 
principles adequate to resolve its cases.  
 In no subfield of election law has this problem more thoroughly 
crippled the Court‘s decision making capacity than in the field of re-
districting, an area that presents perhaps the most pressing prob-
lems in all of American democratic practice. When redistricting rais-
es issues of racial discrimination, the Court‘s tools for dealing with it 
are more than adequate.149 Difficulties arise in handling a much more 
widespread problem, the problem of partisan gerrymandering, in 
which redistricting is performed so as to provide one party with an 
outsized and undeserved advantage over its opponents.150 The Court‘s 
attempt to handle this problem by resort to principles of equal pro-
tection has been a spectacular failure. 
 On three occasions in the last thirty years the Court has tried and 
failed to identify a constitutional standard under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause for adjudicating the constitutionality of partisan gerry-
mandering.151 Its failure is directly traceable to the Court‘s deploy-
ment of equal protection without an underlying theory to identify a 
baseline of proper representation, departure from which can there-
fore be understood as illicit gerrymandering.152 Justice Kennedy, who 
cast the deciding vote in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004),153 admitted this 
frankly in his opinion: 
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Because there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of 
fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to define clear, 
manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the 
particular burden a given partisan classification imposes on repre-
sentational rights. Suitable standards for measuring this burden, 
however, are critical to our intervention.154 
He went on to issue an earnest appeal for help in identifying an ap-
propriate baseline:  
That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be tak-
en to prove that none will emerge in the future. Where important 
rights are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction 
is reason to err on the side of caution. . . . This possibility suggests 
that in another case a standard might emerge that suitably demon-
strates how an apportionment‘s de facto incorporation of partisan 
classifications burdens rights of fair and effective representation.155 
This is as far as the Court has ever gotten in a partisan gerryman-
dering case, and consequently legislatures engaged in the task of re-
districting have little reason to fear effective judicial enforcement of 
any constitutional prohibition on gerrymandering. 
B.   The Empire of the First Amendment 
 By the mid-1970s, the Court began to find that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments no longer reliably supplied decision rules 
for every kind of case dealing with democratic practice and process 
that the Court was willing to accept. Consequently, if the Court was 
to continue to adjudicate such cases by deploying off-the-shelf, readi-
ly available individual rights, it would have to import some other 
right into the democratic arena. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976),156 the 
Court turned decisively to the First Amendment guarantee of free-
dom of speech. In Buckley, the Court invoked the First Amendment 
to determine the constitutional validity of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, the most comprehensive piece of federal campaign finance 
regulation ever enacted, invalidating numerous portions of the Act in 
large part on the ground that they unduly impaired constitutionally 
protected speech.157 Not long after, in Anderson v. Celebrezze 
(1983),158 a case challenging state rules restricting access of inde-
pendent presidential candidates to the election ballot, the Court took 
the significant step of repudiating the Equal Protection Clause as its 
main workhorse in ballot access cases. Instead, the Court announced 
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without explanation that it would thenceforth analyze ballot access 
restrictions under the First Amendment right of freedom of associa-
tion, a second-order right derived by implication from the freedom of 
speech.159 The Court went on in Anderson to invalidate the restriction 
at issue on the ground that it burdened constitutionally protected 
association between candidates and their supporters.160  
 In subsequent cases, the Court has invoked the First Amendment 
to adjudicate nearly every kind of dispute involving regulation of the 
democratic process. It has deployed the First Amendment not only in 
cases revolving around campaign speech, campaign finance, and bal-
lot access, but also in cases dealing with restrictions on voting,161 po-
litical parties,162 primary elections,163 and election integrity.164 Some 
justices have suggested that even partisan gerrymandering cases 
would be more tractable if handled under the First Amendment.165 In 
fact, so versatile has the Court found the First Amendment that it 
has begun to approach its democracy cases as though the First 
Amendment is the only provision in the entire Constitution of the 
slightest relevance to the system of representative democracy it insti-
tutionalizes. This odd approach might be harmless if the Court‘s re-
sort to the First Amendment represented merely some kind of well-
understood judicial synecdoche, in which the First Amendment is in-
voked as a kind of short-hand reference to the entirety of the consti-
tutional scheme. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The Court‘s un-
derstanding has become close to literal; the First Amendment has 
become for the Court essentially a one-provision constitution, com-
plete in itself, capable of solving any and every problem of democracy 
for which judicial review may be had. 
 This approach has been costly, and the main casualty has been 
the First Amendment, which has in these cases been stretched be-
yond all recognition. Although it is indisputably handy, dangling tan-
talizingly at the top of the Bill of Rights like a fly before a trout, free-
dom of speech simply is not an instrument well-suited to the work of 
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adjudicating many of the complex questions that arise concerning 
democratic practice and procedure.166  
 The most notable example of the inadequacy of the right to free 
speech to handle problems for which it has been deployed is the area 
of campaign finance. In a series of cases beginning with Buckley v. 
Valeo (1976)167 and continuing through the Court‘s recent decisions in 
Citizens United v. FEC (2010)168 and McCutcheon v. FEC (2014),169 
the Court has deployed the freedom of speech to decide the constitu-
tionality of laws that restrict the giving and spending of money in 
connection with election campaigns for public office. In so doing, the 
Court has afforded the same degree of First Amendment protection to 
giving and spending money in election campaigns as it does to cam-
paign speech itself; in the Court‘s jurisprudence, there is no constitu-
tionally significant difference between political spending and political 
speaking.170 
 The Court‘s indiscriminate use of the First Amendment has been 
harshly criticized for decades,171 and there is no need to rehearse that 
criticism here. Suffice it to say that money is tied to speech only 
loosely, and that equating the regulation of money spent to buy 
speech with regulation of the speech itself proves far too much and 
thus bites far too deeply into democratically legitimate and justifiable 
regulatory regimes.172 Furthermore, a crucially important component 
of the First Amendment doctrine that the Court imported into the 
arena of democratic practice is a long-standing judicial tradition of 
very nearly absolute opposition to the regulation of fully protected 
forms of speech.173 As a result, the Court‘s importation into the de-
mocracy arena of a pure free speech regime, unmodified to suit the 
context, has led, predictably, to shockingly deregulatory results. 
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Thus, in Buckley, the Court gutted the Federal Election Campaign 
Act by invalidating nearly every limitation on campaign spending 
contained in the Act.174 It continued to invalidate regulatory limita-
tions on political spending in a long series of cases,175 and in some 
instances invalidated limitations on campaign contributions to can-
didates as well.176 In its 2010 decision in Citizens United, the Court 
shocked observers by invalidating a century-old prohibition on direct 
political spending by corporations.177 
 Critical to the Court‘s ruling in these cases is its rejection in Buck-
ley of the basic legitimacy of one of Congress‘s principal reasons for 
enacting restrictions on campaign spending: to redress inequality in 
political influence between the rich and the poor,178 an interest the 
Court deemed ―wholly foreign to the First Amendment.‖179 As a mat-
ter of run-of-the-mill First Amendment free speech doctrine, govern-
ment attempts to orchestrate a fair balance of views expressed in 
everyday discourse in civil society might well be viewed with extreme 
skepticism.180 Speech made in the course of democratic processes in-
tended to constitute a binding expression of the popular will, howev-
er, is no ordinary speech,181 and the Court‘s importation into this 
arena of an existing, off-the-shelf First Amendment regime seems 
effectively to have blinded the Court to extremely significant differ-
ences in context—differences of goals, stakes, complexity, and coun-
tervailing values.182  
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 Nor is First Amendment doctrine particularly well-suited to deal 
with other issues to which the Court has applied it. Consider, for ex-
ample, the Court‘s handling of questions of ballot access, which arise 
when laws regulate the conditions under which candidates may have 
their names placed on the election ballot. For three decades, the 
Court has adjudicated such cases under the First Amendment right 
of association, evaluating ballot access rules in terms of the degree to 
which they burden association between candidates and their follow-
ers.183 There are many ways to think about ballot access. One might 
plausibly say that what is at stake in ballot access cases is presenting 
voters with an appropriate and meaningful range of choices;184 or that 
governmental restrictions on ballot access raise issues of incumbent 
self-protection or partisan self-dealing;185 or that ballot access re-
strictions potentially limit the optimal degree of political competi-
tion.186 But to proceed as though the only constitutionally relevant 
question concerns the ability of candidates and their supporters to 
associate is downright strange. Enjoyment of association with others 
may be a worthwhile benefit of group political participation, but it is 
not the main goal, nor does the printing of a candidate‘s name on the 
ballot in any meaningful way enhance the quantity or quality of as-
sociation between the candidate and his or her supporters.187 A more 
plausible explanation for why the Court analyzes ballot access in the-
se terms, then, is its desire to make use of a readily available, off-the-
shelf right, in lieu of thinking about new or alternative frameworks 
to apply in such cases. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The phrase ―constitutional jurisprudence‖ generally conjures up 
the image of a court working hard to develop a versatile and internal-
ly coherent body of doctrine that furnishes appealing solutions to 
pressing legal problems while bringing constitutional text and pur-
pose into harmonious alignment with judicial implementation. If so, 
then one is hard-pressed to apply the term to the incoherent and 
haphazard body of law developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to adju-
dicate problems of democratic practice and process. To the extent the 
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Court can be said to have such a jurisprudence at all, it is a largely 
accidental one that the Court has stumbled into through habit, the 
vagaries of doctrinal availability, and a susceptibility to path-
dependent decision making, rather than one that has been deliberately 
crafted through the application of judicial imagination and diligence.  
 What is required, clearly, is for the Court to set aside its squeam-
ishness about ―political theory‖ and do in the area of democratic poli-
tics precisely what it has done in other areas of constitutional struc-
ture, such as federalism and the horizontal separation of powers: de-
velop a theory of what the Constitution is trying to do and how it 
strives to go about it. There is no reason why the Court cannot derive 
from the Constitution‘s structural provisions, underlying principles, 
and historic democratic commitments an account of the nature and 
appropriate processes of representative democracy. That would be a 
useful first step in a much-needed program to undo the damage 
caused by the Court‘s failure to provide a sensible foundation for ju-
dicial review in this singularly important area of constitutional law.  
